By Daryl G. Kimball
Beginning Jan. 20, U.S. nuclear weapons policy can and must change. The U.S.-Soviet standoff that gave rise to tens of thousands of nuclear weapons is over, but the policies developed to justify their possession and potential use remain largely the same.
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Reassessing the Role of Nuclear Weapons
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7 comments:
What ACA asks of the Obama Administration is eminently reasonable, but I think more can and should be asked of it. If it is accepted, as proposed, that nuclear weapons are to be used solely to deter the use of other nuclear weapons, then several other points reasonably follow. The first is that, once all the other key nuclear-armed to adopt a similar formulation, there would be no longer be a need to deter their possible use if all states were to get rid of their nuclear weapons, only to deter their possible re-acquisition. The second is that a such a 'non-reacquisition regime' would be a much safer and thus much more desirable than the proposed non-use regime and, thus, one that should be achieved with all due haste.
In his inauguration speech, President Obama said we would work "tirelessly to reduce the nuclear threat." I would suggest that by making clear our intent to ACHIEVE a nuclear-weapon-free world (not just 'work toward' it) he -- we all -- would find the task far less tiring and tiresome.
And what does "only to deter" actually mean, when you get down to it? A threat to use, if it is genuine, means it must be carried out in certain circumstances. If the deterring does not deter, then subsequent use is for revenge primarily. We all know this, and have thought it through. So we must challenge the concept of "only to deter", because it has meaning beyond the rhetoric. For one thing, its logic can be used forever and to a large extent makes a posture sound relatively harmless. ("We aren't threatening anyone, we are only preventing others from threatening us".) And if harmless, why not keep those nukes around forever?
So I would hesitate in suggesting that we would ever swallow or advance the position that nuclear weapons should ever be used "only to deter".
A second point related to Aaron's comments above... A most promising aspect of the draft nuclear weapons convention is that not only must signatories go to zero, but they cannot disengage from the treaty. There is a no opt out clause.
That means, unlike with the NPT, once the world is nuclear weapons free, there is an international regime in place that can respond legally, and with force if necessary, to any breakout. There will be no non-signatories.
Fears that there is a need to keep nuclear weapons around "just in case" are assuaged.
RC
Robin has misinterpreted my phrase "only to deter reacquisition." I do not mean that we should threaten to nuke anyone who starts to acquire nuclear weapons. (How could we? We won't have any nukes.). I mean that a designated set of countries should be tasked with being prepared to also reacquire nuclear-weapon if any country, which cannot be persuaded to stop by other means, starts reacquiring. As with use-deterrence, reacquisition-deterrence would hopefully have the effect of discouraging any attempt to reacquire in the first place. But there the resemblance ends: if use-deterrence fails we a thoroughly ****ed; if reacquisition deterrence fails we are just back where we are today (but with the advantage that we would know how to get back to zero again as soon as the problem is sorted out).
We have to recognize that, short of a new world order, zero nukes is not inherently stable and measures must be taken to stabilize it. This type of safeguard can help to preserve a nuclear-weapon-free world until humanity grows up a bit more.
I should have been clearer. My first comment was directed to the idea held by NWS that it is legitimate to possess "only to deter". That isn't Aaron's view.
My second comment WAS addressing Aaron's comment. (The "second point relating to Aaron's comments", should have said "The second point, and this one related to Aaron's comments..." etc.)
RC
I do not mean to turn this into a two person blog! I just want to conclude by seconding what Robin has said about a Nuclear Weapon Convention having no opt-out clause. The way of dealing with break-out that I describe would not mean the preservation of the Convention, not its dismemberment.
And of course, I am rooting for ACA to get the preliminary narrow interpretation of deterrence adopted ASAP, so that we can move on to the next logical steps without further delay.
For the record, obviously I meant: "The way of dealing with break-out that I describe would mean the preservation of the Convention, not its dismemberment."
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